Of epidemic proportions: physicians, personal risk, and public trust. by Clark, Chalmers C.
INTRODUCTION
Dr.CarloUrbaniwasthefirstpersonto
recognize Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) in a Hanoi, Vietnam,
hospital. On March 29, 2003, only one
month after the discovery, Dr. Urbani died
from the disease, largely because of his
belief that it is a doctor’s duty to “stay close
to the victims.” His wife, Giuliani, mother
of three, challenged her husband on the
point; Dr. Urbani replied, “If I can’t work in
such situations, what am I here for?” With
the question of avian epidemics (indeed
pandemics) looming ahead, we might well
consider the extent of risk that is incumbent
in the physician’s role when facing such
contagious populations. While the level of
risk embraced by Dr. Urbani far exceeds
what I believe should be expected, I will
show, nonetheless, there is a general duty to
treat at a professionally appropriate level of
risk grounded in natural moral obligations
and the medical profession’s reciprocal
standing as a public trust.
SKETCHING THE ARGUMENT
In an essay titled “In Harm’s Way:
AMA Physicians and the Duty to Treat,”
[1], I argued that a physician’s duty to
treat, at personal risk, followed not only
from the language, history, and precedents
of the American Medical Association’s
Code of Ethics, but that the argument was
sound in morally relevant ways. The pre-
sent essay borrows substantially from that
argument, but it will be argued further that
the duty not only enlists fiduciary and con-
tractual features of a professional public
trust, but there are natural aspects of the
obligation to assist that bind us all. The
claim will be that our natural obligations
are elevated if there are enhanced capaci-
ties to render aid, particularly in times of
critical need.
The natural aspects of an obligation to
assist arise in medical contexts from our
natural vulnerability to illness and disease.
Principles of justice indicate that asymme-
tries in natural vulnerability, if they can be
adjusted, ought to be adjusted in reason-
able terms among competing obligations
and considerations. As medical science
has developed greater measures to amelio-
rate and cure illness, the duty to deploy
such measures has accrued greater moral
dimensions, which, of course, requires that
there are persons competent to make such
measures available. Since the medical
profession is thus distinctively situated to
dispense needed medical care, there fol-
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fession to deploy those measures.
The duty to assist is also capaciously
founded in the special contractual features
that flow from an implicit social covenant
grounded in the profession’s standing as a
public trust. According to this covenant,
the profession has negotiated and commit-
ted itself to a social arrangement that is
neither market-based nor politically dri-
ven. It is a relationship whereby the pro-
fession assumes a fiduciary obligation to
care for the medical well-being of persons
before considerations of profits or politics.
The point being that persons — as patients
— are to be regarded as logically prior to
other interests and concerns, though not
independent of such concerns. Crucially,
this priority is held as a relationship of
public trust rather than one that is legally
crafted or defined.
All this is not to say that the medical
profession, as public trust, does not have
essential economic and political dimen-
sions. What it does indicate is that when
these factors cannot readily be reconciled
within the patient-centered perspective, the
patient-based priority must visibly trump
other competing interests and concerns. In
such conflicts of professional obligations,
the compact of trust comes into full public
witness. During such times, especially, the
profession is required to publicly reinforce
its self-proclaimed true North. Public con-
fidence that the medical profession can be
trusted to cleave to patient care, above all
else, is the moral center of the profession.
One noteworthy aspect of this analysis
is that while physicians, nurses, and other
medical professionals are thus recognized as
stewards of this trust, it must be acknowl-
edged that since physicians have been the
primary recipients of the socially bestowed
advantages and benefits, physicians thereby
carry greater burdens of social responsibili-
ty — Noblesse oblige.
This scheme of medical obligations
might seem a bit lofty to some, but there
are real world terms that have kept this
trust in place. As indicated, in return for
maintaining the priority of patients, the
profession has been remunerated with a
public largess of professional autonomy
and the attendant goods that flow from
such standing. Principal among those
goods are control over one’s work, high
social status, and sizable income. [2] The
duty can perhaps be schematized as fol-
lowing from five distinct “Cs”: covenant,
consent, contract, compensation, and
capability.
As to the capability portion of the argu-
ment, the treatment follows an argument to
be elaborated later derived from Judith Jarvis
Thomson.[3] The point being that during
times of critical need, and in the absence of
overriding complications or burdens, we all
have the duty to assist if we have the capac-
ity to render it. However, duties to assist are
ratcheted up by increased capacity to render
crucially needed aid. Other things being
equal, a trained lifeguard, whether working
in that role or not, has a greater moral duty to
assist a swimmer in trouble than the average
bather on the beach. The knowledge and
skills possessed by persons trained in life-
saving not only make it more feasible to
assist in effective ways, but the same lifesav-
ing skills also help to protect the lifeguard
from pitfalls to which the untrained are more
apt to fall victim.
The overall argument concludes thus
that beyond the natural obligation to assist,
the person-based features of the medical pro-
fession, as public trust, along with the
knowledge and skills available as part of the
profession, casts members of the profession
into a role similar to social lifeguards, espe-
cially during times of critical medical need.
BACKGROUND TO
THE DUTY TO TREAT
Our question regarding personal risk
was famously addressed by the American
Medical Association with the publication
of the first AMA Code of Ethics in 1847.
The concern that prompted talk of person-
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al risk was the presence of pestilence and
the threat of impending epidemics. The
expression of this duty was rendered in
bold and unequivocal terms.
When pestilence prevails, it is [physicians’]
duty to face the danger, and continue their
labors for the alleviation of suffering, even at
the jeopardy of their own lives.[4]
Of course, pestilence wasn’t anything
new to human history. But surprising to
many is the fact that in the broad sweep of
medical history, from Greece and Rome to
modern times, no consistent professional
tradition could be identified regarding
physicians and personal risk when pesti-
lence did prevail. Indeed, when faced with
contagious populations, many famous
physicians, including Galen, fled for their
lives. Hence, the declaration made by the
AMA, in 1847, was at once dramatic and
professionally defining. In an essay by
Zuger and Miles, it is noted that since
1847, the AMA’s bold move to embrace a
policy of personal risk during public perils
has had sustained effects.
In the history of ethical codes for the medical
profession, this statement is unprecedented …
The AMA’s strong statement probably owes
more to a determination to establish the honor
and prestige of the profession than to physi-
cians’ actual abilities … Still, the sense of
duty formalized by theAMAwas sustained …
it becomes far more difficult to find recorded
instances of physicians’ reluctance to accept
the risks that epidemics entailed for them.[5]
It is interesting to note that after 1957,
the language of personal risk disappears
from the AMA Code without argument or
explanation.[6] Huber and Wynia argue
that since the language of accepting per-
sonal risk was largely crafted as a response
to the threat of pestilence, it disappeared
thus, because the threat no longer seemed
to be a serious danger. What happened,
they write, was that “by the 1950s, the era
of massive epidemics was perceived to be
ending in America.”[7] They further note
that statements on epidemics were quietly
withdrawn in 1977 as “irrelevant ‘histori-
cal anachronisms’”[8].
Largely due to the terrorist events sur-
rounding September 11, 2001, the language
of responding at personal risk returned to
the AMA literature in December 2001,
when the House of Delegates of the AMA
adopted a “Social Contract with Humanity”
that contained a Declaration of Professional
Responsibility.[9] The key portion of the
Declaration reads as follows:
“We, the members of the world community of
physicians, solemnly commit ourselves to:
4. Apply our knowledge and skills when
needed, though doing so may put us at
risk.”[10]
The crucial years for the duty to treat at
personal risk arose thus after AMA’s procla-
mationof1847. Whileitwasinthisyearthat
the duty was first articulated, the obligation
cannot be argued to gain social legitimacy
until the profession itself assumes a clear and
commandingpositionwithinthesocialorder.
Let us briefly turn to this question.
After the turn of the 19th century, the
unfolding of the profession’s social posi-
tion took a distinctive turn and the issue
received important analysis and elabora-
tion in Paul Starr’s Pulitzer Prize-winning
book, The Social Transformation of
American Medicine.[11] In this book,
Starr refers to the medical profession in
the United States as the “sovereign profes-
sion” and ultimately locates the key to the
profession’s transformation in its acquisi-
tion of social authority. While the most
influential single explanation for the
ascendancy of American medicine can be
found with the rise of medical science,
Starr is quick to qualify this by noting that
if it was science alone, things easily might
have gone in another direction. Indeed,
rather than elevating medicine into profes-
sional sovereignty, “[t]he growth of sci-
ence might have reduced professional
autonomy by making doctors dependent
upon organizations.”[12]For the profession to succeed in the
way it has, the profession has had to per-
suade the public not only that it has the sci-
entifically grounded capacity and compe-
tence to address the concerns of patients
and the public, but that it will faithfully
address those concerns — as a fiduciary —
in recognition of the reciprocal terms of a
public trust. This fiduciary posture at once
distances the profession from the norms of
free market competition, and its reigning
ethos of caveat emptor, and also spikes the
view that the medical profession simply
functions as a monopolistic power elite that
has self-servingly driven its way into social
control. Starr puts the point this way:
If the medical profession were merely a
monopolistic guild, its position would be
much less secure than it is. The basis of its
high income and status … is its authority,
which arises from lay deference and institu-
tionalized forms of dependence. The private
interests of physicians alone would be insuf-
ficient to sway the society had they been
unable to satisfy the felt needs of others.[13]
Accordingly, the accomplishment of
the medical profession required having
established itself publicly as the unchal-
lenged authority for medical matters and as
the institution most willing and capable of
deploying those skills. Crucially, the
notion of “authority” that Starr considers
flows from its “classical sense” as that
which “signifies the possession of some
status, quality, or claim that compels trust
or obedience.”[14] Starr furthers the point
noting that doctors, as professionals,
“...claim authority, not as individuals, but
as members of a community that has objec-
tively validated its competence.”[15]
Since I have used the AMA’s Code of
Ethics as part of the literature providing
strong notice of a duty to treat a personal
risk, it might be well to mention some
prominent confusions that have arisen in
the interpretation of the AMA Code. One
source of trouble for our argument comes
from Principle VI of the AMA Code,
which asserts that:
A physician shall, in the provision of appro-
priate patient care, except in emergencies, be
free to choose whom to serve, with whom to
associate, and the environment in which to
provide medical care.[16]
A casual reading of this principle,
when taken out of context, might suggest
that “except in emergencies,”AMA physi-
cians have the right to serve wherever and
in whatever circumstances they please,
and this need not include service during
times of epidemics, especially when fac-
ing personal risk to themselves. That is,
by taking a narrow interpretation of
“emergencies” (e.g., bystander cases,
emergency room duty), some might think
the autonomy rights of AMA physicians
actually trump broader public service
duties. Such a reading, on its face, seems
well out of keeping with the broader spirit
of the AMA Code. However, the narrow
focus does speak to a libertarian strain that
should be give us pause. The narrow con-
strual of “emergencies” must be seen as
defensible in some legitimate form if the
libertarian interpretation is to sustain
itself. Generally speaking, the question is
whether AMA physicians should be ethi-
cally bound to subordinate their autonomy
rights to public needs when faced with the
threat of an acute public medical need.
Two distinct matters need to be consid-
ered. First is the question of whether societal
obligations ever trump the autonomy rights
of physicians. Second, if they do, does that
involve an obligation to assist, even at a
physician’s peril? As to the first question,
the logic of the principles requires an answer
in the affirmative. In an essay from 1996, I
took this question to task and concluded that
as a matter of logical consistency, the narrow
construal can not be sustained.
… if we have included an independent refer-
ence to societal obligations and allowed that
except in emergencies (narrowly construed)
such obligations may be overruled in any
case, then in principle, we have allowed
physician autonomy to overrule in every case.
However, this would render the societal pro-
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vision altogether pointless. … it appears that
the narrow construal of emergency would
arbitrarily foreclose on the responsibility to
society clause. Thus, a close reading of the
AMAdocument reveals a derivable, although
indirect constraint on physician autonomy for
at least some societal emergencies.[17]
While it might be objected that even
under this interpretation a particular physi-
cian’s autonomy remains free and uncon-
strained in selecting which societal duties
are to be undertaken, it should be under-
stood, nonetheless, that such a considera-
tion arises secondary to the more general
principle — of the interpretation — that
some societal duties must trump physi-
cians’ autonomy rights, Principle VI ter-
minology notwithstanding. Once it is
allowed that broader societal emergencies
sometimes trump physicians’ autonomy
rights, the question shifts from “whether
or not” to questions of “when and to what
extent.” This analysis leaves the position
regarding public service and service at risk
as an open question not to be foreclosed
even by the narrow reading of Principle
VI.
Certainly, more could have been done
by the AMA to avoid any predilection to
such a narrow interpretation. However, in
behalf of the AMA, the newest version of
the Code (2001) contains revisions that re-
emphasize that “a physician must recog-
nize responsibility to patients first and
foremost, as well as to society, to other
health professionals, and to self”
(Preamble); there is also a phrase assert-
ing the duty to contribute to “the improve-
ment of the community and the betterment
of public health” (Principle VII), and that
“A physician shall support access to med-
ical care for all people” (Principle IX).
With this array of argument and his-
torical record, the seeming gap that
Principle VI leaves open to interpret
autonomy rights as a trump over societal
obligations looks thin and tenuous indeed.
Consistency arguments aside, a pure liber-
tarian reading on Principle VI could now
only hold sway if it was read out of con-
text as something of a loophole clause.
Yet even if we ignore the logical point, it
needs to be noted that since 1984, any ten-
dency to such a narrow analysis must also
fail. In the Preface of the 2002-03 edition
of the AMA Code, we read:
No one Principle of Medical Ethics can stand
alone or be individually applied to a situation.
In all instances, it is the overall intent and
influence of the Principles of Medical Ethics,
which shall measure ethical behavior for the
physician.[18,19]
Clearly then, we are instructed to
avoid considering principles in isolation
from the companion principles. Individual
cases are to be considered by a balance
among the principles. So while the decla-
ration and other features of the should not
be used to interpret the principles, it
remains open to consider the declaration,
opinions, and other aspects of the code as
a basis to inform our judgment regarding
individual cases. The point is usefully
compared to what John Rawls has called
“considered judgment” within a concep-
tion of “reflective equilibrium.” For
instance, when Rawls speaks of reflective
equilibrium, he envisions a situation in
which decisions are said to be negotiated
in a “... process of mutual adjustment of
principles and considered judgements
...”[20] This conception is aimed to bring
principles and judgments into a state of
greater equilibrium, “after a person has
weighed various proposed conceptions
and he has either revised his judgments to
accord with one of them or held fast to his
initial convictions...”[21]
A DUTY TO ASSIST: REALIZING
THE RISKS
In 1991, Norman Daniels took up our
question of a duty to treat at personal risk
in the context of HIV infection and argued
for such a duty based on an analysis of
“consent.”[22] In his analysis, Danielsconsiders the AMA’s 1847 claim that a
physician is expected to treat “without
regard to the risk to his own health” an
extreme and unrealistic view. He writes,
“[w]e must believe that there are some
limits, however vaguely specified, to the
risks physicians have agreed to face.”[23]
Daniels then constructs a basic argument
for the duty to treat in terms of what he
calls a middle ground or a “modifiedAMA
position.” Generally speaking, his argu-
ment runs as follows: Since physicians
have consented to some (vaguely defined)
standard of risk when they enter the pro-
fession, if the circumstances (HIV, bioter-
rorism, etc.) fall under that standard of
risk, then there is a duty to treat even at
personal risk if the risks fall within that
standard. The point of this argument,
while it might seem vague, actually aims
to settle one point with finality: Namely, is
there such a duty or no?
The argument by Daniels appears
based on both public and professional
understanding of what it means to adopt
the physician’s role. That public informa-
tion and understanding of the physician’s
role is readily available is evident in the
long list of medical programs stretching
back to Doctor Kildare, Marcus Welby,
and Ben Casey. More recently, shows
such as M*A*S*H, General Hospital, ER,
Chicago Hope, Grey’s Anatomy, House,
and Scrubs have also focused their gaze on
various dimensions of the role of doctor-
ing. I take it as uncontroversial, thus, that
there is abundant public information
regarding the physician’s role. The dedi-
cation and sacrifice suffered by physicians
for the sake of their patients is always a
thematic undertone, whether the protago-
nist lives up to the standard or not, and
whether or not such is the explicit subject
of the particular episode or show. While
Daniels appears to rely on this kind of gen-
eral understanding of the physician’s role,
he draws back from endorsing the extreme
language of the 1847 code that indicates
physicians should accept risks up to and
including the risk of their own lives.
Certainly, the idea of physicians risking
their lives as a moral duty is aimed much
too high to be realistic and, consequently,
some discussion of what is meant by
acceptable risk is needed.
Alexander and Wynia point out that a
variety of arguments have been offered
supporting a duty to treat under conditions
of personal risk, but they claim, “[e]ach of
these arguments has limitations and none
can provide specific guidance as to the
exact degree of risk to be undertaken. Yet
as with other public service professions,
including the fire and police forces, risk
has traditionally been part of medical care
...”[24]
While Daniels’ argument makes a
strong conceptual point, it lacks certain
moral and applied considerations that are
needed if our goal is to affect behavior and
policy. This essay aims at provoking such
policy ambitions. As to the moral side of
the issue, what is absent in the consent
argument is the covenantal character of the
medical role. The idea of a covenant har-
bors greater moral weight than does con-
sent or contract. Consent and contract are
well captured by our sense of “rational
agreement,” but one can consent and con-
tract quite rationally where one does not
promise (e.g., think of consenting to work
for low wages due to lack of options).
Normally, in promising, we do more than
agree to follow a certain course of action;
we commit ourselves rather to the right-
ness of that course. This promissory qual-
ity of the medical role can be seen dis-
tinctly in that most well recognized feature
of the medical profession: the publicly
sworn oath of service to patient care.
As to a more applied focus for our
analysis, our primary goal is shifted from
a pure theoretical determination of the
question to an approach that is designed to
achieve consensus and effect recognizable
change. Such an applied approach does
indeed aim toward philosophical correct-
ness but sets a premium on intermediate
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goals of well realized consensus above
final correctness. Following this concep-
tion of applied ethical analysis, a general
standard for rendering aid at personal risk
will be articulated. The standard will
focus on a conception of a “reasonable
physician.” This reasonable physician
standard has the practical value of being
analogous to the “reasonable person” stan-
dard used regularly in tort law as a guide
for the jury in determination of the facts
regarding cases of alleged negligence.
Crucial to the conception is that the rea-
sonable physician is held to possess the
virtues of prudence and due care in their
decisional capacity.
A second key aspect of the applied
analysis is that while persons have natural
obligations to assist in “minimally decent”
ways, in the face of a critical human need,
the standard of aid is largely a function of
our power or capacity to assist and our
ability to control factors that create per-
sonal risk. If having special abilities to
assist creates greater obligations to assist,
it is particularly true in the case of physi-
cians and the general public. Nonetheless,
obligations to “oneself” and to considera-
tions of effectiveness in service can be
seen to properly limit physician’s obliga-
tions to assist.
CONCEPTUALIZING
PROFESSIONAL RISK
An argument to assist in “minimally
decent” ways follows an argument noted
earlier by Judith Jarvis Thomson. This
argument generates a duty to assist from
an articulation of the parable of the good
Samaritan. Thomson draws our attention
to the tragic case of Kitty Genovese and
the events that took place on March 13,
1964, in Kew Gardens, Queens. On this
day, 38 people watched and did nothing to
help as Kitty Genovese was stabbed
repeatedly and finally killed. Of the 38
witnesses to her murder, not one person
made a phone call to police. Simon,
Powers, and Gunneman also have used
this horrible incident as paradigmatic for
defining a general “moral minimum” for
assisting others in the case of a “critical
human need.” The authors note that:
What so deeply disturbed the public’s moral
sensibility was that in the face of a critical
human need, people who were close to that
need and had the power to do something
failed to act.[25]
Thomson further considers a three-
fold distinction on the notion of
Samaritanship. According to Thomson,
there are not only good Samaritans, but
splendid Samaritans and minimally decent
ones as well. Thomson points out that the
witnesses to the murder of Kitty Genovese
fell below what counts as even minimally
decent, and that, she says, is a standard
none of us should fall below.
It should be noted that Thomson and
Simon, et al., implicitly follow the point
made earlier about the contrast between
applied ethical analysis and pure theoreti-
cal analysis. Thomson’s argument rather
obviously steps back from an analysis of
“the good” in favor of a broader standard
of “minimal decency.” The point by
Simon and colleagues parallels Thomson
with the goal of a “moral minimum.” This
less stringent demand has the advantage of
wider agreement and thus greater consen-
sus and policy effectiveness, especially
when appeal is made to the reasonable
health care professional or physician.
We must appreciate that what counts
as minimally decent behavior varies with
degree of ability to render aid. If I am
trained in water safety and lifesaving, my
obligation to assist a drowning victim is
greater than the obligation of an untrained
citizen. Note, too, that by virtue of such
training, personal risk is reduced.
Consequently, given the expert knowledge
and training of physicians, the minimal
standard of rendering aid is higher for
physicians, in relevant cases, than the
medically unschooled.So, let us take medical ability and
consider the question of personal risk
under the standard of “a reasonable physi-
cian” along with a standard of “minimal
decency.” The reasonable person stan-
dard, as articulated in tort law, requires the
two virtues of prudence and due care. In
light of this, the reasonable physician
should realize some minimal acceptance
of medically indicated risk as required in
the exercise of due care in treating
patients.
The combination of factors indicates
that members of the medical profession
have special obligations to assist and to
face some degree of risk beyond the aver-
age person in at least three ways. First,
since the ability to render aid for physi-
cians is greater, the obligation to assist is
also elevated. Second, by consideration of
Daniels’ consent argument and our focus
on the reasonable physician, we must rec-
ognize that by freely joining a profession
designed in part to combat disease, a rea-
sonable physician consents to at least
some minimal standard of professionally
appropriate risk. And third, a reasonable
physician, through virtues of prudence and
due care, can be expected to realize that
the profession — and thus themselves —
flourishes due to a social belief that physi-
cians would be available in times of public
medical distress. The upshot is that to try
to exempt oneself from this obligation,
without special reasons, would quite clear-
ly fall afoul of basic injunctions against
social “free ridership.” In light of the fore-
going, I do not think it amiss to expect that
our reasonable physician would concur.
Consequently, if there is a social
expectation that the medical profession
has an obligation to render aid, even at
personal risk, such an expectation cannot
be taken lightly by the professional leader-
ship, and especially by our reasonable
physician. Indeed, there is a phrase that
explicitly captures the point and was con-
tinuous in all the AMA codes from 1912
until 1955, allowing that physicians
should be ready to respond to public med-
ical perils “whenever temperate public
opinion expects the service.”[26]
RESTRICTING OBLIGATIONS TO
PERSONAL RISK
It has been noted that due to expert
knowledge and ability, physicians have
obligations akin to social lifeguards in times
of critical public need. Similarly, during
national threats affecting the health and
safety of its citizens, such as injuries and ill-
ness resulting from terrorism or bioterror-
ism, physicians carry a higher burden of
responsibility than other health profession-
als and average citizens. Even so, personal
risk, when substantial, may exempt us from
the obligation to render aid. Our lifeguard
would surely be excused from normal life-
saving expectations if a drowning victim is
seen caught in a strong current that plunges
precipitously over a lofty cliff. It is likely
that splendid Samaritanship, in such cases,
would not only fail to address the critical
need, but would tend to compound it. Ill
conceived “heroism” tends to undermine
actual effectiveness and creates greater
harm than good. Following Aristotle, we
might say, courage without wisdom quickly
tends to rashness.
Since risk is ubiquitous, the issue is
one of degree. While decisions will vary
according to the situation and individual
judgment, it has been noted that special
training inherent in the profession should
provide a degree of protection not avail-
able to the average citizen. Thus, special
efforts should be in place to set aside vac-
cines and other therapies for professionals
to ensure that health professionals are able
to perform and be protected in their work.
The point of protecting the helper first, for
optimal effectiveness, is well made by the
airline’s recommendation that if oxygen
masks are dropped due to a sharp decline
in cabin pressure, persons should secure
their own masks before acting to assist
others.
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PUBLIC GOODS AND PUBLIC
TRUSTS
Using the analogy of a social life-
guard, my contention has been that the
reasonable physician realizes that in the
face of infectious epidemics, the role of
doctoring is grounded in a public trust that
extends beyond care for individual
patients to include the public health, espe-
cially in times of critical need.
Like our lifeguard, however, personal
risk is moderated by professional knowl-
edge and skills. The broader society, for its
part, owes the medical profession first
access to vaccines and relevant equipment
as well as financial support to undertake
measuresofdevelopment. Athoroughtreat-
ment of the factors that might be included
under standards of deployment is beyond
the scope of this essay, but clearly there are
base line expectations that should be
observed under conditions of minimal pro-
fessionalism. Among those are prepared-
ness to staff hospital facilities, to become
educated in the treatment, self-protection,
and management of the particular form of
virulence, to assist in the diagnosis of actual
as opposed to false cases, and to administer
anti-anxiety medication when dealing with
false and actual cases. The point of such
minimal expectations is not to limit behav-
ior, but to provide a clear lower floor stan-
dard of acceptability. As ever, some, like
Dr. Urbani, will exceed those standards.
As we face growing threats of new,
widespread infectious disease, avian H5N1,
bioterrorism, and other looming epidemics,
the need for the medical profession to
respond aggressively is great. My effort has
been to argue that by vigorously and wisely
addressing this critical need, the medical
profession not only provides a crucial pub-
lic good, but in so doing, it strengthens its
professionalstewardshipandreplenishesits
social standing in our reciprocally negotiat-
ed public trust.
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